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Abstract 
This article will examine as to whether U.K. social security policies since 2008 could 
constitute one or more crimes against humanity (CAH). This examination will focus on the 
likely approach of the International Criminal Court (ICC) based upon an analysis of existing 
international criminal jurisprudence including the International Criminal Tribunal for the 
former Yugoslavia (ICTY) and the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR). 
Following on from defining what constitutes a CAH, the extent to which social security 
policy in the U.K. may have been an attack for the purpose of constituting a CAH will be 
explored. Following this, the extent to which the pre-requisite mental element is satisfied will 
be analysed. It will ultimately be concluded that austerity driven social security policy in the 
U.K. can amount to crime against humanity of other inhumane acts under article 7 (1) (k) of 




This article will critically examine the extent to which policies and actions relating to social 
security policies within the United Kingdom (U.K.) can constitute a crime against humanity 
(CAH). The research hypothesis posed is that social security policies in the U.K. can 
constitute a CAH.  
This article proceeds in five sections which will inform a conclusion. Firstly, the place of 
Economic and Social Rights (ESRs) in the realm of CAH will be explored.1 Secondly, what 
constitutes a CAH will be examined. It will be highlighted that the answer to the question 
rests on the extent to which an attack, without which a CAH cannot be said to have occurred, 
has taken place. In order to address this, and thirdly, the enumerated acts of extermination, 
torture, and other inhumane acts (OIA) will be examined. This is because an attack can be 
said to have occurred if the multiple commission of any one, or combination, of these acts 
can be established. Having addressed that acts have occurred, the actus reus, the fourth 
section of this article will examine the mens rea, or mental elements, which must be satisfied 
in order to establish individual criminal responsibility for the CAH of OIA. This article will 
engage with the current debate in international criminal law as to the mental element required 
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at the International Criminal Court (ICC) in relation to CAH. Following this, and fifthly, the 
prosecution of CAH in the U.K. will be explored.  
It will ultimately be concluded that acts pertaining to the provision of social security in the 
United Kingdom can constitute a crime against humanity entailing individual criminal 
responsibility. 
II. Crimes against Humanity and Economic and Social Rights 
Violations 
 
Today suffering exists which does not readily align with traditional concepts of CAH.2 These 
new forms of suffering have been asserted to be the “product of economic policies.”3 Skogly 
considers a shift in paradigm summarised as refocusing CAH towards the outcome, not the 
means, of creating suffering through severely damaging inhuman acts.4 Such a shift may 
allow greater scope for prosecuting inhumane acts as the requirements laid down for a crime 
to constitute a CAH set a higher threshold than human rights abuse.5 Some argue that the 
definition of CAH should be expanded to be based upon the punishment of human rights 
violations.6 Within such an expansion the place of ESR violations within CAH would be 
more certain. This may alter state policies with the added effect being that the threat of 
prosecution7 would also deter future misconduct.8 This is important given that the violation of 
ESRs may be a mechanism through which some outcomes are achieved with it being 
suggested by Skogly that such violations “may amount to genocide.”9 
This is supported by the contention that Civil and Political Rights “cannot be enjoyed on an 
empty stomach”10 and this notion of indivisibility and interdependence, as supported by a 
number of international instruments,11 is perhaps why some have argued against limiting 
CAH to the realm of integrity rights.12 Although CAH often do occur as a consequence of the 
                                               
2 Manfred Max-Neef “The good is the bad that we don't do. Economic crimes against humanity: A proposal” 
(2014) 104 Ecological Economics 152, 153  
3 Ibid. 
4 Sigrun I. Skogly “Crimes Against Humanity - Revisited: Is There a Role for Economic and Social Rights?” 
(2001) 5(1) The International Journal of Human Rights 58, 67 
5 Richard Vernon “What is Crime against Humanity?” (2002) 10(3) The Journal of Political Philosophy 231, 
235 
6 Sévane Garibian “Crimes against humanity and international legality in legal theory after Nuremberg” (2007) 
9(1) Journal of Genocide Research 93, 101 
7 Eamon Aloyo “Improving global accountability: The ICC and nonviolent crimes against humanity” (2013) 
2(3) Global Constitutionalism 498, 517 
8 Diana Kearney “Food Deprivations as Crimes Against Humanity” (2013-2014) 46 New York University 
Journal of International Law and Politics 253, 256 
9 Skogly (n 4) 64 
10 Geoffrey Robertson Crimes Against Humanity (Penguin Books 2012), 220 
11 Vienna Declaration and Programme of Action, adopted by the World Conference on Human Rights in Vienna 
on 25 June 1993, (I) (25); See also Proclamation of Teheran, Final Act of the International Conference on Human 
Rights, Teheran, 22 April to 13 May 1968, U.N. Doc. A/CONF. 32/41 at 3 (1968), para. 13; See also Declaration 
on the Right to Development A/RES/41/128, 4 December 1986          
12 Skogly (n 4) 74 
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commission of violence this is not a pre-requisite.13 An attack need not be violent in nature14 
and exerting pressure to act in a particular way may constitute an attack.15 If a policy causes 
severe and widespread, or systematic, harm to civilians it “may constitute a (nonviolent) 
crime against humanity.” 16  In this sense some would argue that “it is immaterial where the 
suffering comes from”17 and that the focus of CAH ought to be, as opposed the means, the 
extent to which the effect equates to severe and widespread or systematic harm.18 
This article is premised upon the contention that austerity, as an economic policy, has 
severely adversely affected the enjoyment of ESRs within the U.K. More specifically, it is 
contended that, the welfare system reform which has occurred in the U.K. since 2008, and 
which has been justified by reference to these austerity policies,19 has in some instances 
directly violated ESRs.20 Thus social security policy has significantly harmed civilians in the 
U.K. This demonstrates the intersectionality which exists between social security policy and 
ESRs violations. This intersectionality is the means through which social security policy can 
be considered within the sphere of CAH. The purpose of the following sections is to establish 
the extent to which these ESRs violations can amount to a CAH. 
 
III. What Constitutes a Crime against Humanity? 
 
CAH have been subject to “inconsistent definitions.”21 Although acts which would constitute 
CAH today have occurred throughout history, the concept as one entailing legal criminal 
responsibility has been described as a major innovation of the International Military Tribunal 
at Nuremberg.22 This is because it was “first articulated as an international offence in Article 
6 (C) of the Charter of the Nuremberg tribunal.”23 The aim of this was to punish acts “that 
were either organised by Nazi law or tolerated by the authorities”24 by making individuals 
directly responsible under International Criminal Law.25 In this sense, a CAH is a crime 
against humaneness so offensive to general legal principles that it becomes of international 
                                               
13 Chile Eboe-Osuji “Crimes Against Humanity: Directing Attacks Against a Civilian Population” (2008) 2(2) 
African Journal of Legal Studies 118, 119 
14 Kriangsak Kittichaisaree International Criminal Law (OUP 2001) 94 refers to the Akayesu (n 58) para. 581 in 
support of this. 
15 Ibid. 
16 Aloyo (n 7) 504 
17 Skogly (n 4) 75 
18 Aloyo (n 7) 500 
19 Committee on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities (CRPD) “Inquiry concerning the United Kingdom of 
Great Britain and Northern Ireland carried out by the Committee under article 6 of the Optional Protocol to the 
Convention” CRPD/C/15/R.2/Rev.1, October 2016, para. 113; para. 113(a) explicitly links this to welfare system 
reforms justified in the context of austerity measures. Thus, this statement applies to social security policy. 
20 The Committee on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities “considers that there is reliable evidence that the 
threshold of grave or systematic violations of the rights of persons with disabilities has been met in the State 
party” see Ibid.  
21 Robert Cryer et al. An Introduction to International Criminal law and Procedure Third Edition (CUP 2014) 
229 
22 Nina H. B. Jorgensen The Responsibility of States for International Crimes (OUP 2000) 118 
23 Ilias Bantekas International Criminal Law Fourth Edition (Hart 2010) 184 
24 William A. Schabas “Crimes Against Humanity: The State Plan or Policy Element” in Leila N. Sadat and 
Michael P. Scharf The Theory and Practice of International Criminal Law (Martinus Nijhoff 2008) 360 






concern26 serving as an exception to the antiquated rule that States could treat their citizens as 
they pleased.27 
The International Military Tribunal’s purpose was to address issues relating to World War 
II.28 Therefore some argued that for acts to constitute a CAH they had to be linked to armed 
conflict.29 This requirement is the ‘armed conflict nexus’ and was also a prerequisite element 
of CAH under the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY).30 This 
“contextual limitation”31 narrowed the scope of CAH. However, it was described as 
“obsolescent”32 in Tadic33 and is no longer a requirement of CAH;34 nor is it an element of 
the Customary International Law.35 Therefore, it is now well settled36 that no nexus to armed 
conflict is required to establish a CAH.37  
One of the major achievements of the Statute of the International Criminal Court (ICC), also 
referred to in the literature as the Rome Statute, has been doing away with the requirement of 
armed conflict38 thus recognising developments in customary international law.39 The Statute 
has been described as being a codification of existing law40 and Article 7 of this statute “is, 
for sure, the most detailed definition to date of”41 CAH being the first codification of CAH in 
a multilateral treaty since Nuremberg.42 This definition requires that one, or more, of the acts 
enumerated in Article 7(1) be committed alongside the contextual element,43 that is, “as part 
of a widespread or systematic attack directed against any civilian population, with knowledge 
of the attack.”44  
A. Widespread or Systematic  
The requirement that the crime is committed as part of a widespread or systematic attack is 
“the ‘chapeau’ of the Statute.”45 This chapeau sets a standard of seriousness to be surpassed 
                                               
26 Kittichaisaree (n 14) 85 
27 Peter Malanczuk Akehurst’s Modern Introduction to International Law Seventh Revised Edition (Routledge 
1997) 354 
28 Antonio Cassese and Paola Gaeta International Criminal Law Third Edition (OUP 2013) 86 
29 Broomhall (n 25) 48 
30 Cryer et al. (n 21) 231 
31 Bantekas (n 23) 187 
32 William A. Schabas An Introduction to the International Criminal Court Fourth Edition (CUP 2011) 109 
33 Tadic Case Quoted Ibid. 
34 Broomhall (n 25) 49 
35 Robert Cryer Prosecuting International Crimes (CUP 2005) 251 
36 Cryer et al. (n 21) 233 
37 Mahmoud C. Bassiouni International Criminal Law: A Draft International Criminal Code (Sijthoff & 
Noordhoff 1980) 75 
38 Timothy LH McCormack “Crimes Against Humanity” In Dominic McGoldrick et al. The Permanent 
International Criminal Court (Hart 2004) 184 
39 Ibid. pp. 185 
40 Steven R. Ratner and Jason S. Abrams Accountability for Human Rights Atrocities in International Law 
Second Edition (OUP 2001) 49-50 
41 Mauro Politi and Giuseppe Nesi The Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court (Ashgate 2001) 79 
42 Willian J. Aceves and Paul L. Hoffman “Pursuing Crimes Against Humanity in the United States: The Need 
for a Comprehensive Liability Regime” in Mark Lattimer and Phillipe Sands Justice for Crimes Against 
Humanity (Hart 2003) 239-240 
43 Massimo Renzo “Crimes Against Humanity and The Limits of International Criminal Law” (2012) 31 Law 
and Philosophy 443, 444 
44 Article 7(1) The Statute of the International Criminal Court (ICC Statute) 







in order to incur international criminal responsibility46 and is reflective of customary 
international law.47 It prevents all inhumane crimes falling under the remit of CAH.48 This 
ensures that only crimes committed as part of organisational action or policy reach the 
threshold of CAH49 and the nature of the terms widespread and systematic are evidence of 
this purpose as some form of organisation is inherent.50 Furthermore, the nature of the acts as 
occurring on a widespread or systematic basis can be taken as evidence of organisation or 
policy.51 In Jelisic it was held that although these two requirements were not cumulative they 
could overlap.52 These two terms therefore have different meanings53  which have been 
labelled “alternative” 54  and “disjunctive”55 conditions. In this sense, the prosecution need 
only prove that one threshold is satisfied.56 
The term widespread refers to the scale of the acts. In Kunarac widespread referred to the 
“large-scale nature of the attack and the number of victims”57 whereas in Kayishema the 
requirement was that it was “directed against a multiplicity of victims.”58 Akayesu offers a 
more complex definition which additionally  suggests that the acts must be carried out 
“collectively with considerable seriousness.” 59 Building on this Kearney observes that the 
ICC definition characterises widespread as “pertaining to ‘the large-scale nature of the attack 
and the number of targeted persons.’"60 Cryer suggests that an assessment of whether or not 
an attack reaches this threshold must be decided on the facts.61 Ultimately, there is no 
numerical threshold which, once surpassed, sees an attack classified as a CAH. 
Systematic however, refers to “the organised nature of the acts.”62 In this sense the two are 
distinguished by a “high degree of forethought.”63 Along this vein, a systematic attack is one 
which follows a “preconceived policy or plan.”64 The Akayesu case goes further than this to 
also include, within the definition of systematic, the involvement of “substantial public or 
private resources.”65 In sum, systematic is a level of precise66 organisation or design. For the 
purpose of this article, a policy conceived in, initiated by, and passed down from, the highest 
                                               
46 Alexander Zahar and Goran Sluiter International Criminal Law (OUP 2008) 209 
47 Lyal S. Sunga The Emerging System of International Criminal Law (Kluwer Law International 1997) 162 
48 Matt Halling “Push the Envelope – Watch It Bend: Removing the Policy Requirement and Extending Crimes 
against Humanity” (2010) 23 Leiden Journal of International Law 827, 828 
49 Ratner and Abrams (n 40) 68 
50 Mahmoud C. Bassiouni Crimes Against Humanity in International Criminal Law Second Revised Edition 
(Kluwer Law International 1999) 86 
51 Cryer (n 35) 255 
52 The Prosecutor v Goran Jelisic IT-95-10-T, Trial Chamber, 1999, para. 53 
53 David Marcus “Famine Crimes in International Law” (2003) 97 American Journal of International Law 245, 
272 
54 The Prosecutor of The Tribunal Against Clement Kayishema Obed Ruzindana, ICTR-95-1-1, 1997, para. 123 
55 Melanie O’Brien “Protectors on trial? Prosecuting peacekeepers for war crimes and crimes against humanity 
in the International Criminal Court” (2012) 40 International Journal of Law, Crime and Justice 223, 227 
56 Cryer et al. (n 21) 234 
57 Prosecutor v Dragoljub Kunarac IT-96-23, 2002, para. 94 
58 Kayishema (n 54) para. 123; See also Marcus (n 53) 272 “'Widespread' refers to the number of victims” 
59 The Prosecutor v Jean-Paul Akayesu ICTR-96-4-T, 1998, para 580 
60 Kearney (n 8) 270 
61 Cryer et al. (n 21) 235 
62 Kunarac (n 57) para 94. 
63 Kearney (n 8) pp. 271 
64 Kayishema (n 54) para. 123; See also Marcus (n 53) 272 
65 Akayesu (n 59) para. 580 










echelons of, government.  As, such, a government’s social security policy, reaches this 
threshold. 
B. Attack 
The preceding subsection suggests that social security policy can be both widespread and 
systematic. Consequently, if acts in this area can be established as attacks for the purposes of 
CAH they would constitute a CAH. However, the requirement of attack is more problematic 
due to the fact that its use in the ICC statute differs from its use in common parlance.67  
In various judgements, an ‘attack’ is the context, the event even, “in which the enumerated 
crimes must form part.”68 Within a single attack one, or many, of the enumerated crimes may 
occur.69 Thus an attack is the “accumulation” 70 of the enumerated crimes linked by the 
chapeau. In some circumstances this chapeau may be difficult to establish, therefore Hansen 
has argued that an accumulation of these acts “which is organized and follows a regular 
pattern will be taken as evidence of the existence of a policy.”71 The concept of attack is 
“elaborated in”72 Article 7(2)(a) of the ICC Statute as meaning “a course of conduct 
involving the multiple commission of acts referred to in paragraph 1 against any civilian 
population, pursuant to or in furtherance of a State or organizational policy to commit such 
attack.”73 This definition is reproduced here in full in order that all the elements of an attack 
are plainly seen. The latter two of these elements, that the acts are against a civilian 
population and are part of a policy, are clearly fulfilled in regards to social security policy. 
Thus, the focus of this article is the nature of the acts. Therefore, in order to answer the 
research question, the extent to which social security policy and actions can equate to ‘a 
course of conduct involving the multiple commission of acts referred to in paragraph 1’ must 
be examined.  This is because it need only be established that the Article 7(1) acts have 
occurred.74 Thus, if the multiple commission of acts75 occurs this constitutes an attack which, 
if of a widespread or systematic nature, may constitute a CAH. 
IV. Acts related to Social Security Policies in the United Kingdom as 
amounting to ‘a course of conduct involving the multiple 
commission of acts referred to in paragraph 1’ 
 
Having now established what constitutes an attack, a number of the acts enumerated in 
Article 7(1) will be examined in the context of the United Kingdom. These acts are chosen 
given their intersectionality76 with the field of social security provision. Extermination is 
                                               
67 Aloyo (n 7) 510 
68 Kayishema (n 54) para. 122 
69 Ibid. 
70 Bantekas (n 23) 190 
71 Thomas O. Hansen “The Policy Requirement in Crimes Against Humanity: Lessons from And for The Case 
of Kenya” (2011) 43 The George Washington International Law Review 1, 12 
72 Bantekas (n 23) 201 
73 ICC Statute (n 44) art 7(2); See also Halling (n 48) 828; See also Akayesu (n 59) para. 581 “of attack' may be 
defined as an unlawful act of the kind enumerated in…the [ICTR] Statute” 
74 Claire Henderson “Australia’s Treatment of Asylum Seekers” (2014) 12(5) Journal of International Criminal 
Justice 1161, 1166 
75 This terminology is chosen in the statute, as opposed to commission of multiple acts, so that it cannot be inferred 
that different types of acts must be committed; See Kittichaisaree (n 14) 94 
76 See section II 







considered as it relates to “the intentional infliction of conditions of life.”77 Building upon 
this, torture is considered as it relates to “the intentional infliction of severe pain or 
suffering.”78 Finally, Other Inhumane Acts are also considered given that this relates to the 
infliction of suffering or serious injury to health by means of an inhumane act which is 
similar to other enumerated acts.79 These acts are therefore highlighted as they can act, in 
relation to CAH, as a link between the conditions of life faced by civilians reliant on social 
security policy and the social security policies themselves. If it can be established that these 
acts have occurred as the result of social security policy it follows that a wide spread or 
systematic attack has occurred in the United Kingdom.  
A. Extermination 
Article 7(1) (b) of the ICC Statute lists ‘Extermination’ as an enumerated act which is 
distinguishable from, and broader than, genocide as no persecutory elements are required.80 
Extermination is considered here given that it “includes the intentional infliction of 
conditions of life…calculated to bring about the destruction of part of a population.”81 The 
ICC statute allows for assistance in defining the acts to be taken from the ICC Elements of 
Crimes.82 These Elements can be referred to in attempting to define the parameters of 
customary international law regarding a particular act83  and offer guidance that extermination 
requires the “mass killing of members of a civilian population.”84 It has been argued that this 
“may encompass the withdrawal of food or other necessary items or consumables that sustain 
life” 85 and this links to the notion of inflicting conditions of life.86 A broader definition has 
been provided by the ICTY in the Brdanin case where it was held that "the actus reus of the 
crime of extermination consists of any act, omission or combination thereof which 
contributes directly or indirectly to the killing of a large number of individuals."87 The 
Tribunal has also held that this encompasses the institution of circumstances causing the mass 
death of others.88 
An argument pertaining to social security provision along these lines would be that this 
provision has caused conditions of life which ultimately, albeit indirectly, led to the deaths of 
large numbers of individuals within the UK. Such policies include fitness-for-work 
assessments which can result in individuals losing disability benefits contrary to the advice of 
                                               
77 ICC Statute (n 44) art 7(2) b 
78 Ibid. art 7(2) e 
79 Ibid. art 7(1) k 
80 McCormack (n 38) 190 
81 ICC Statute (n 44) Article 7(2)(b); See also International Criminal Court (ICC Elements) “Elements of Crimes” 
<https://www.icc-cpi.int/NR/rdonlyres/336923D8-A6AD-40EC-AD7B-
45BF9DE73D56/0/ElementsOfCrimesEng.pdf> accessed on 20th December 2016 Article 7(1)(b) 
82 ICC Statute (n 44) Article 9(1) 
83 Fannie Lafontaine “Canada’s Crimes against Humanity and War Crimes Act on Trial” (2008) 10 Journal of 
International Criminal Justice 269, 274 
84 ICC Elements (n 81) Article 7 (1)(b)(2) 
85 Bantekas (n 23) 191 
86 The Trial Chamber in the Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia have supported this view See; 
Randle C. DeFalco “Accounting for Famine at the Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia: The 
Crimes against Humanity of Extermination, Inhumane Acts and Persecution” (2011) 5 The International 
Journal of Transitional Justice 142, 148 
87Prosecutor v. Brdanin, Case No. IT-99-36-T, Judgement, 2004, 389; Quoted in Kearney (n 7) 266 
88 Kayishema (n 54) para. 146 
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medical professionals89 as well as punitive benefit sanctions.90 This can be supported by the 
fact that 2,380 people were found to have died after having being found fit for work91 which, 
in some circumstances, would have seen individuals lose benefits.92 Of the 49 peer reviews 
which were “internal reports written by civil servants after investigations into suicides and 
other deaths that have been linked to benefit claims”93 10 of them involved the deceased 
having had their benefits sanctioned at some stage.94 This equates to over twenty percent of 
the investigated deaths. The Department of Work and Pensions (DWP) asserts, because the 
cause of death was not recorded in collecting this data, that “no causal effect between the 
benefit and the number of people who died should be assumed.”95 Thus this author is wary of 
making such assumptions. Even so, individual cases serve to highlight that links can, and 
indeed do, exist between the withdrawal of benefits and the deaths of those reliant on them.96 
The cases of David Clapson97 and Mark Wood98 stand testament to this. This is because they 
demonstrate that benefits withdrawals and sanctions has been causally linked to the deaths of 
some of those subject to them. More so, DWP staff are being trained to recognise suicidal 
                                               
89 See the case of Mark Wood below (n 98) 
90 See the case of David Clapson below (n 97) 
91 Department of Work and Pensions “Mortality Statistics: Employment and Support Allowance, Incapacity 
Benefit or Severe Disablement Allowance” 2015, [accessed at 
https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/459106/mortality-statistics-esa-
ib-sda.pdf on 06/01/2017] pp. 8 
92 Lutz Oette “Austerity and the Limits of Policy-Induced Suffering: What Role for the Prohibition of Torture 
and Other Ill-Treatment?” (2015) 15 Human Rights Law Review 669, 679 
93 John Pring “Comment: Long-awaited peer reviews suggest ministers failed to act after deaths of ‘vulnerable’ 
claimants” Disability News Service, 14th May 2016 <accessed at 
http://www.disabilitynewsservice.com/comment-long-awaited-peer-reviews-suggest-ministers-failed-to-act-
after-deaths-of-vulnerable-claimants> accessed on 6th January 2017 
94 John Pring “One in five benefit-related deaths involved sanctions, admits DWP” Disability news Service, 15th 
May 2015 <http://www.disabilitynewsservice.com/one-in-five-benefit-related-deaths-involved-sanctions-
admits-dwp/> accessed on 6th January 2017 
95 Department of Work and Pensions (n 91) 9 
96 Oette (n 92) 678 
97 David Clapson had his benefits terminated in July 2013 as a punitive measure for missing two appointments 
at the job centre. His cause of death was diabetic ketoacidosis which was itself caused by an acute lack of 
insulin. At the time of his death he had £3.44 in his bank account. This lack of finances no doubt contributed to 
Mr Clapson’s death at the time of which his stomach was empty of food. On top of this, this lack of finances 
will have contributed to his inability to pay for electricity which resulted in his electricity supply being cut off. 
This resulted in the fridge in which Mr Clapson stored his insulin not working. This would affect the ability of 
the insulin to fulfil its purpose. For these reasons, it is contended that as the benefit sanction resulted in Mr 
Clapson’s dire financial situation, and that financial situation contributed to his death, the benefit sanction was 
causally linked to his death. See Ashley Cowburn “The deaths, sanctions and starvation that prove I, Daniel 
Blake is accurate – despite what some critics say” The Independent, 28th October 2016 
<http://www.independent.co.uk/news/uk/politics/i-daniel-blake-accuracy-ken-loach-benefits-sanctions-deaths-
iain-duncan-smith-toby-young-a7384581.html> accessed on 6th January 2017 
98 Mark Wood died months after an Atos fitness-for-work assessment found him fit for work and the jobcentre, 
on account of this decision, stopped his employment and support allowance leaving him £40 per week to live 
on. This was despite a letter from his doctor, Nicholas Ward, to the job centre declaring Mr Wood ‘absolutely 
unfit for work.’ His cause of death was probably ‘caused or contributed to by Wood being markedly 
underweight and malnourished’. Between April 2013, around the time his benefits were cut, and his death in 
August 2013 Mr Wood’s Body mass index, which can be used to measure whether an individual is of a healthy 
weight for their height, dropped from 14.1-11.5. This drop correlates with the withdrawal of benefits. On the 
basis of this is contended that Mr Wood’s death was causally linked to the withdrawal of benefits. See Amelia 
Gentleman “Vulnerable man starved to death after benefits were cut” The Guardian, 28th February 2014 







intention and this is evidence that death has become part of the benefit and social security 
structures in the U.K.99 
This reasoning, however, faces difficulties in establishing the intent of the perpetrator who 
must know that the conduct is part of a widespread or systematic attack.100 The requirement 
of intent has been supported in the ICTY101 and DeFalco has highlighted “establishing the 
requisite mens rea for each accused” 102 as a difficulty in obtaining conviction for 
extermination. Meaning guilty mind103  mens rea relates to intention which is “a condition for 
criminal liability”104 and has been referred to as the ‘mental element’ by the ICC.105 A lesser 
degree of intent may be found in some of the case law where the notion of having knowledge 
that multiple deaths “were a probable consequence of the act or omission”106 was deemed 
sufficient. The ICTR has held that the mens rea standard may be one of “intention, 
recklessness, or gross negligence.”107 This requires the perpetrator to be “reckless, or grossly 
negligent as to whether the killing would result” 108 with an awareness that their acts formed 
part of a mass killing event.109  The notion of an emerging standard of recklessness in 
international criminal law for CAH will be explored in further detail below.110 Given that the 
DWP is training staff to recognise suicidal intention a strong argument could be made that 
recklessness or gross negligence are present in these circumstances. However, this notion is 
qualified by the widespread or systematic attack being against particular groups111 and this 
acts as a bar to this line of argument. Thus, there is difficulty in establishing the crime of 
extermination.  
B. Torture 
Article 7(1) (f) of the ICC Statute enumerates torture as a CAH. This is defined as the 
intentional infliction of physical or mental severe pain or suffering112 unless arising from 
lawful sanctions.113 There is evidence of suffering in the UK as a result of social security 
policy and yet Torture and ill-treatment do not feature in this debate. 114 This is despite the 
fact that the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) has found that claims based upon the 
intersectionality between social security provision and Article 3 of the European Convention 
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on Human Rights (ECHR)115 may be successful in certain circumstances,116  provided that the 
“minimum level of severity”117 is met. The case law suggests that state responsibility will 
arise when an individual is wholly dependent on the state and is faced “with official 
indifference when in a situation of serious deprivation or want incompatible with human 
dignity.”118  
In 2013, 291,000 Job Seekers Allowance (JSA) claimants were subject to sanctions, although 
the number of those recommended for sanctions was much higher. 119 The public purpose of 
such sanctions, is to engender, through coercion, the JSA claimant’s transition into 
employment.120 The sanctions have caused “reduced food consumption, including hunger; 
homelessness; and stress-related illnesses, particularly anxiety, depression and suicide.”121  
Even so, outside of the detention setting there is a lack of clarity as to what conditions 
amount to the intentional infliction of severe mental or physical suffering.122 This is 
especially so for the purposes of this article. This is because for CAH of torture to occur, the 
victims must be “in the custody or under the control of the perpetrator.”123 Thus, there would 
be some difficulty in establishing the crime of torture for the purposes of CAH. Further still, 
and once again, there is difficulty establishing the mens rea required to successfully prosecute 
along this vein. 
C. Other Inhumane Acts 
The requirement that these Other Inhumane Acts (OIA) be “of a similar character 
intentionally causing great suffering, or serious injury to body or to mental or physical 
health”124 is the only limiting factor to the application of this provision and provides clarity, 
and some degree of legal certainty.125 This “residual”126 catch all127 clause was envisioned to 
prevent any “lacuna”128 in the punishment of CAH which may have been the result of an 
exhaustive list of Crimes.129 This has the potential to allow for evolution130 and thus create a 
wider concept of CAH.131  The extent to which the acts linked to social security are similar to 
other acts in the statute132 is thus the final point of analysis upon which the answer to the 
research questions will be found.  
Despite the fact that the acts in question may not have reached the thresholds set forth by the 
crimes of extermination or torture, the preceding two sub-sections illustrate how the effects of 
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social security provision have had similar effects. This demonstrates the similar nature of the 
acts in question to the enumerated crimes for the purposes of article 7(1) (k). In regard to 
food deprivation, Kearney suggests that OIA may be the “most viable way that ESR 
violations can be criminalized under the CAH umbrella.”133 This point is used to add 
credence to this author’s claim that acts relating to social security policy which result in ESRs 
violations have the potential to be classified as a CAH under the ICC Statute. This provision 
is of importance given that it does not require special intent or a specifically targeted 
group.134 What it requires is “serious bodily or mental harm.”135 There is strong evidence to 
support that such harm has occurred in the U.K. and that “the threshold of grave or systematic 
violations of the rights of persons with disabilities has been met in the State party.”136 Given 
that it was established above that great harm and deaths have occurred, on a large scale, due 
to the imposition of conditions of life as a result of social security policy the use of Article 
7(1) (k) may allow these acts of a similar nature to extermination and torture to be classified 
as a CAH.  
V. Mens Rea and Other Inhumane Acts 
The preceding section has demonstrated that acts relating to social security policy which have 
resulted in ESRs violations have the nature of CAH in that they may constitute OIA. 
However, in order to be successfully prosecuted these acts, the actus reus, must be 
accompanied by the mens rea. This mental element is defined in Article 30 of the ICC Statute 
and requires that “unless otherwise provided”137 the material elements of a CAH, as a crime 
falling under the jurisdiction of the ICC, can only incur criminal responsibility, liability, and 
punishment if “committed with intent and knowledge.”138 Intent and knowledge are further 
elaborated upon later in Article 30. Intent is split between conduct and consequence with it 
being required that “in relation to conduct, that person means to engage in the conduct”139 
and regarding consequences “that person means to cause that consequence or is aware that it 
will occur in the ordinary course of events.”140 Knowledge, meanwhile, “means awareness 
that a circumstance exists or a consequence will occur in the ordinary course of events.”141 
Article 30 codifies “the mental element as a general requirement of individual criminal 
responsibility for the first time in international criminal law”142 and sets a high143 threshold of 
mens rea in requiring both intent and knowledge.144 This standard applies in all cases, 
regarding international criminal law, unless a rule specifically regulating the mens rea 
exists.145 This general standard appears to be limited to intent alone.146 Thus, the ICC has 
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adopted a mental element defined by a high level of culpability.147 This appears counter to 
tribunal cases which have indicated that a standard below this high level of direct intent (or 
dolus) can be applied in order to establish culpability.148 Furthering this, Werle and 
Jessberger contend that, on account of the wording of Article 30(2) (b) “recklessness and 
dolus eventualis do not meet the requirements.”149  
Despite Cassese’s suggestion that recklessness or dolus eventualis have the potential to be 
encompassed by the definition of intent enshrined in Article 30(2)150 debate exists as to 
whether this is indeed the case with cases both supporting and rejecting the inclusion of 
recklessness as adequate mens rea for prosecution in international criminal law.151 If rejected 
the resulting high standard for the mental element may act as a barrier to prosecuting the 
CAH of OIA in the U.K. 
However, the seeming requirement of a high level of intent may only apply in circumstances 
in which it is not otherwise provided. In this sense, Article 30, in starting with the phrase 
“unless otherwise provided,”152 may in fact only exclude dolus eventualis or recklessness “as 
far as it is not otherwise provided.”153 Schabas contends that, because the definitions of 
crimes within the ICC Statute “have their own built-in mental requirements,”154 this high 
standard, as a general rule, will not apply to the crimes enumerated in the ICC Statute in 
many circumstances. Some authors contend that the implications of this are that Article 30 
“should be interpreted as a default rule that is applied only if there are no specific rules on the 
mental element at all in either the other provisions of the ICC Statute, the Elements of Crimes 
or customary international law.”155 Schabas suggests that, pertaining to CAH, there exists a 
pre-existing mens rea requirement; that of “knowledge of the attack”156 and if the reasoning 
in this paragraph is accepted it follows that CAH, including OIA, are not subject to the 
default Article 30 rule. 
Furthermore Aloyo highlights that, the intent in relation to OIA has been defined by the 
elements of crimes157 as the perpetrator being “aware of the factual circumstances that 
established the character of the act.”158 This has been interpreted as referring to “those 
circumstances that render the consequences the ordinarily expected result of the act.”159 It 
follows from this line of reasoning that a perpetrator should be culpable, and satisfies the 
mental requirements of the CAH of OIA, if the result of their actions is the normal 
consequence, ordinarily expected, of such acts. This aligns with the Enigster Case, 
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highlighted by Cassese,160 which held that “as to intent, it is a well-known rule that any 
person in his right mind is held to intend the natural consequences of his actions.”161  
Beyond this, Kearney suggests that “there is an emerging recklessness standard in 
international criminal law.”162 Recklessness and dolus eventualis are common standards in 
domestic jurisdictions which warrant full criminal responsibility of the offender.163 
Recklessness has been described as “the mens rea of foreseeability”164 and this definition 
allows acts of which the consequences were, albeit not the primary aim of the act,165 probable 
to be punished. Building upon this, regarding foreseeability, the W case166 demonstrates that 
when a consequence is commonly known a perpetrator who causes an individual to face such 
consequences acts “at least with dolus eventualis for the serious consequence suffered by 
victim.”167 Thus, in cases where such consequences are commonly known a perpetrator 
cannot argue that no foresight existed as to the consequences of their actions. The negative 
effects of actions relating to social security in the U.K. have become well known, especially 
so during the reign of the austerity imposing governments since 2008. For example, as 
referenced above, DWP staff are being trained to recognize suicidal intention. This 
demonstrates that it is known to the DWP that deaths have been occurring. As the policies 
have continued, unchanged, this may allow an argument of recklessness to be made. In 
aligning this analysis with the contentions made within this article, it is contended that the 
effects of continuing policies which have led to consequences of the CAH of OIA occurring 
satisfy the mental element requirements. This is because, after seven years, the implications 
of such policies can in no way be unknown to those implementing them as they are 
commonly known. Consequently, the effects of the perpetrator’s actions are foreseeable to 
them. 
If it is accepted that, given the specific mental elements within CAH, Article 30 does not 
apply in these circumstances, or failing this Cassese’s suggestion that recklessness or dolus 
eventualis have the potential to be encompassed by the definition of intent enshrined in 
Article 30(2) is instead accepted, it must also be accepted that a lesser standard of intent will 
suffice to satisfy the mental element of a CAH. This author has demonstrated that such a 
level of intent, be that dolus eventualis or recklessness, has been satisfied given that the 
effects of social security policies are common knowledge, and therefore the consequences of 
such policies are foreseeable. This foreseeability demonstrates that perpetrators are aware of 
the factual circumstances that established the character of the act given that the consequences 
were the ordinarily expected result of the policies, and acts to implement them. This would 
appear to satisfy the mental element of intent for the CAH of OIA found in the elements of 
crimes. Further still, this foreseeability would satisfy the mens rea requirements if a lesser 
standard of recklessness or dolus eventualis is accepted. In this author’s opinion, these two 
prongs, relating to foreseeability, suggest that the mental elements of the CAH of OIA have 
been satisfied. Combined with the analysis in the second and third sections of this article, 
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which contended that a widespread or systematic attack against a civilian population has 
occurred and is continuing to occur in the U.K. the satisfaction of the required mental 
elements, the mens rea, will allow individual criminal culpability to be found.  
Many individuals have been involved in the design, implementation and enforcement of the 
social security policy which this author has argued has led to ESRs violations and as such to 
the CAH of OIA. This includes inter alia; elected ministers; civil service staff, particularly 
those in the Department of Work and Pensions (DWP); jobcentre staff, who impose 
sanctions; and Atos employees, who conduct the work capability assessments. It is, however, 
not the purpose of this article to determine who exactly incurs individual criminal 
responsibility in regard to the circumstances in which a CAH is established on account of 
ESRs violations caused by Social Security Policy. Rather, it has been to establish that such 
responsibility can exist. As such this author accepts that further research is required in order 
to build upon these findings by identifying those who ought to incur such responsibility. 
 
VI. Prosecuting Crimes against Humanity in the United Kingdom 
Building upon these preceding sections, which have addressed the nature of international 
criminal law more generally, this section will apply the findings of this article to the context 
of the U.K. The International Criminal Court Act 2001 (ICCA)168 “gives effect to the Rome 
Statute of the International Criminal Court”169 within the U.K. Making it “an offence against 
the law of England and Wales for a person to commit… a crime against humanity”170 within 
the U.K.171 Article 50(1)172 couples, and aligns, the concept of a CAH in the domestic law of 
the U.K with that definition set forth under Article 7 of the ICC Statute. Further, the 
provisions of Article 7 of the Rome Statute are included in Schedule 8, Article 7 of the ICCA.  
Consequently, as this definition has been elaborated upon in the preceding sections, it need 
not be repeated here.  
The intent requirements in the Law of the U.K. relating to CAH mirror the requirements laid 
down in Article 30 of the ICC Statute. This demonstrates the principle of positive 
complementarity whereby States are encouraged to prosecute international crimes 
domestically. However, this is with the addition of a fourth section which, not only 
recognises that s.66  of the ICCA corresponds with Article 30173 but also, allows the U.K. 
Courts to “take into account any relevant judgment or decision of the ICC.”174 More 
crucially, “account may also be taken of any other relevant international jurisprudence”175 
and this section would therefore allow account to be taken of the ICTR and ICTY 
judgements, referred to earlier in this article.176 Both the ICTR and  ICTY have accepted 
lesser degrees of intent including “recklessness, or gross negligence”177 as to whether killing 
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would result178 with awareness that the act formed part of a mass killing event.179 This 
demonstrates the potential for the U.K. Courts to prosecute when there is knowledge that 
multiple deaths “were a probable consequence of the act or omission.”180 This argument can 
be extrapolated, and combined with the findings of the previous section, to contend that as 
deaths as a result of social security policies in some circumstances are commonly known and 
thus foreseeable, as a probable consequence, individuals have satisfied the mental elements in 
the U.K. This mental element, as mens rea, is required “before a defendant can properly be 
treated as blameworthy for the consequences of his actions”181 and consequently this finding 
is of significance as it naturally follows that individuals can be held to account in the U.K. 
courts for their actions.  
This links to the notion of oblique intent which, in British law, satisfies the mens rea by 
presuming intent when, although intent is disputed, the result of an action was “virtually 
certain.”182 In U.K. law this oblique intent has been described as established by, for the 
purposes of the offences specified in the ICC statute, the ICCA 2001.183 Thus, if a result, 
pertaining to a CAH, is foreseeable in the ordinary course of events “irrespective of whether 
it is his aim that it should occur”184 the individual whose actions cause that result to occur can 
be prosecuted for CAH under U.K. law. This allows an individual to be held as intentionally 
causing a result when “although it is not his purpose to cause it, he knows that it would occur 
in the ordinary course of events if he were to succeed in his purpose of causing some other 
result.”185 Therefore, in considering once again the purpose of benefit sanctions,186 as a 
manifestation of social security policy in the U.K., including, but not exclusively, punishing 
individuals, and coercing and conditioning them into certain behaviours it is clear that the 
results of a nature of a CAH of OIA are not the intended purpose. However, it is also clear, 
and it has been well documented,187 that these sanctions have resulted in conditions of life 
which this author believes to be tantamount to OIA. Further, in many circumstances these 
results are part and the parcel of the ordinary course of events; they are foreseeable. 
Consequently, they can incur individual criminal responsibility and can be prosecuted in the 
U.K. under the ICCA 2001 as they satisfy both the material and mental elements. 
Despite this, in order to be instituted the ICCA requires the consent of the Attorney 
General.188  Once instituted, such proceedings are triable only by indictment189 and, if a guilty 
verdict is returned, “a person convicted of an offence is liable to imprisonment for a term not 
exceeding 30 years.”190  Other than already highlighted, the means of prosecution goes 
beyond the research hypothesis of this article and will not be addressed here. Regardless of 
                                               
178 Ibid. para. 144 
179 Ibid.  
180 Lukic & Lukic (n 106) 269 
181 Winnie Chan and Andrew P. Simester “Four Functions of Mens Rea” (2011) 70(2) Cambridge Law Journal 
381, 383 
182 Bantekas (n 23) 41 
183 Kate Grady “International crimes in the courts of England and Wales” (2014) 10 Criminal law Review 693, 
701; See also Anonymous (n 169) 768 
184 Anonymous (n 169) 768 
185 Itzhak Kugler “The definition of oblique intention” (2004) 68(1) Journal of Criminal Law 79, 80 
186 See the discussion of coercion in the final paragraph of Section IV(B) 
187 Ibid. 
188 ICCA (n 168) s.53(3) 
189 Ibid. s.53(2) 





Deleted:  Given that the U.K.’s Attorney General is currently, 
and by convention, a Member of Parliament who is aligned to 
the party, and government, in power such consent is unlikely 
to be given. This procedural hurdle is perhaps the greatest 
barrier to the prosecution of the CAH of OIA in the U.K. 
elaborated upon in this piece. Such an institution would not 
only, naturally, be critical of the government’s policy but 
more so would suggest that governmental policy was illegal 
and ought to be changed. Thus, it is incredibly unlikely that 
an Attorney General in such a position would institute, or in 
fact allow to be instituted, prosecutions for CAH against their 
own party. Even if instituted by a new transitioning 
government such an institution would reek of political 
manoeuvring and points scoring
Deleted:  
Commented [MB30]: This is probably the reality, but perhaps 
not so much a conclusion based on scientific legal analysis. I 
would leave this point out of the article. (btw the peer of this 
article comes from a jurisdiction, in which such conflict of 
interest is likely be avoided by appointing another decision 
maker to replace the conflicted person. Could this be a 
solution in the UK?) 
Commented [GL31R30]: Point deleted  
Deleted: Consequently, if a CAH of OIA in relation to the 
results of the U.K. government’s social security policies were 
to be prosecuted it would more than likely be done so by the 
ICC.
Deleted: Even so, if such proceedings were in fact instituted 
in the U.K. they
Deleted: ¶







this, the fact that a CAH capable of being prosecuted has occurred is not diminished simply 
by the fact that the prosecution itself may face difficulties. In addition to the previous sections 
of this article, this section has served to highlight that the mental element, and thus criminal 
culpability, can be established regarding the CAH of OIA as a result of social security 
policies in the U.K.  
VII. Conclusion 
Through analysing what constitutes a crime against humanity, and having outlined the 
requirements of the chapeau of the ICC Statute, this article suggested that the extent to which 
acts relating to social security policy were an attack had to be examined. In undertaking this 
examination, it was found that this question could only be answered in considering the extent 
to which social security policy can equate to ‘a course of conduct involving the multiple 
commission of acts referred to in paragraph 1’ of the ICC Statute. Although partial cases 
were made for the crimes of both extermination and torture having taken place it was clear 
that both these lines of analysis had their undoings. They did however serve to provide 
evidence that the crime of ‘other inhumane acts of a similar character intentionally causing 
great suffering, or serious injury to body or to mental or physical health’ may well have 
occurred multiple times. If this reasoning is accepted an attack has occurred. This conclusion 
is reached given that the effects of social security policy in the United Kingdom have been 
such as to cause serious injury to health as well as death. The number of victims of sanctions 
should fulfil the requirement of “widespread” and this article has already contended that as 
this was governmental policy it fulfils the requirement of “systematic”.  
In addressing the mental element required by both the ICC Statute and ICCA 2001 this author 
sought to argue that individual criminal responsibility can be established, and thus 
prosecutions can occur, for the results of these social security policies. It was highlighted that 
Article 30 of the ICC statute appears to require a high threshold of intent, in order for such 
responsibility to be established. Even so, Cassese, as a proponent of the view that 
recklessness and dolus eventualis can be read into the Article, as well as a number of 
academics, who support the contention that Article 30 does not apply to CAH as such crimes 
specify their own intent requirements, were highlighted. Neither of these two approaches, be 
that the acceptance of either the higher or lower threshold of intent, can be conclusively 
determined to be correct. However, section 66(4) of the ICCA 2001 allows the determination 
of intent, in domestic prosecutions of CAH in the U.K., to take account of relevant 
international jurisprudence from sources other than the ICC. As both the ICTR and ICTY 
have held that the lesser standard of intent, including recklessness, satisfies the mens rea it 
follows that the U.K. Courts can, if they so choose, determine that the lower threshold of 
intent is in fact appropriate for the establishment of individual criminal responsibility for 
CAH in the U.K. Thus, the mens rea, or mental element, can in fact be established in 
regarding the CAH of OIA in the U.K. as a result of social security policy. It is contended 
that these crimes can be prosecuted in the U.K. as the lesser mental element of recklessness 
or dolus eventualis is satisfied.  
In conclusion, this author has established that Economic and Social Rights Violations caused 
by social security policies can amount to a widespread and systematic attack against a 
civilian population and this, combined with the satisfaction of the mental elements, answers 
the research hypothesis in the affirmative: social security policies in the U.K. can constitute a 
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crime against humanity. Using this finding as a springboard, and in order to establish the 
extent to which the U.K.’s austerity influenced social security policies since 2008 can be 
prosecuted as a crime against humanity, future research must analyse the social security 
policies themselves in more detail. In combination with this, such research must also identify 
those who may incur individual criminal responsibility. 
 
